Anti-monarchism in english republicanism by Dzelzainis, Martin
Dzelzainis, ‘Anti-monarchism’ 1




In the Review and Conclusion to Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes sets out the terms on 
which individuals can submit to the new republican regime in England – an 
undertaking prompted, he says, by the failure of ‘divers English Books lately printed’ 
to explain properly the relationship between conquest and consent.  Having remedied 
this failure, he then turns, somewhat abruptly and surprisingly, to remedy a lapse of 
his own.  In Chapter 35 of Leviathan he had argued that when the scriptures spoke of 
the kingdom of God this was not to be interpreted metaphorically but taken literally, 
as signifying a commonwealth ‘wherein God was King, and the High Priest was to be 
(after the death of Moses) his sole Viceroy, or Lieutenant’ (Hobbes 1996: 282, 484; 
see Pocock 1973: 170-74).  Hobbes now finds this account of the Jewish 
commonwealth incomplete in that he ‘omitted to set down who were the officers 
appointed to doe Execution; especially in Capitall Punishments’.  What concerns him 
in particular is that the judicial practice whereby ‘he that was convicted of a capitall 
Crime, should be stoned to death by the People; and that the Witnesses should cast the 
first stone’ had not been ‘thoroughly understood’.  More alarmingly still, Hobbes 
says, this in turn ‘hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill 
another, in some cases, by a Right of Zeal; as if the Executions done upon offenders 
in the Kingdome of God in old time, proceeded not from the Soveraign Command, 
but from the Authority of Private Zeal’ (Hobbes 1996: 487). 
 Given that Hobbes’s political theory is in large measure designed to prevent 
any derogation whatsoever from the sovereign’s power, he could not allow this 
‘dangerous opinion’ to go unchallenged.  By way of countering the threat, Hobbes 
scrutinizes the relevant scriptural texts with the aim of showing that this supposed ius 
zelotarum is merely an illusion.  For example, Numbers 25 tells of a time when ‘the 
people began to commit whoredom with the daughter of Moab’ thereby provoking the 
wrath of God.  The plague is only averted when Phineas slays one such idolatrous 
couple who display themselves before Moses and ‘all the congregation of the children 
of Israel’.  Gratified by this piece of summary justice, the Lord then instructs Moses to 
‘give unto [Phineas] my covenant of peace’ (Numbers 25:1-10).  But, Hobbes insists, 
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 When Phinehas killed Zimri and Cosbi, it was not by right of Private Zeale: 
 Their Crime was committed in the sight of the Assembly; there needed no 
 Witnesse; the Law was known, and he the heir apparent to the Soveraignty; 
 and which is the Principall point, the Lawfulnesse of his Act depended wholly 
 upon a subsequent Ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt 
 (Hobbes 1996: 488). 
 
Other texts are despatched similarly, leaving Hobbes free to conclude that there ‘is 
nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance Executions by 
Private Zeale; which being oftentimes but a conjunction of Ignorance and Passion, is 
against both the Justice and Peace of a Common-wealth’ (ibid.). 
 Unlike Hobbes’s much-discussed intervention in the Engagement debate,1 this 
passage has received barely any comment, despite the fact that it sits rather 
uncomfortably at the centre of the Review and Conclusion. Hobbes himself speaks 
only in cryptic (and, as we shall see, somewhat disingenuous) terms of his original 
omission being the result of ‘not then thinking it a matter of so necessary 
consideration, as I find it since’.  Given that Hobbes had completed the first thirty-
seven chapters of Leviathan by May 1650 (see Hobbes 1996: x), Chapter 35 must 
have been written within sixteenth months of what he would have regarded as the 
most spectacular modern instance of summary justice, and a signal ‘conjunction of 
Ignorance and Passion’: the execution of Charles I.  But if the regicide had not led 
Hobbes to discuss the ius zelotarum in Chapter 35, what had occurred in the interim to 
make the topic ‘a matter of so necessary consideration’ when he came to compose the 
Review and Conclusion in April 1651? 
 The immediate answer is that Hobbes’s hand was forced - at a very late stage - 
by the putting into circulation of his earlier and very different thoughts on the ius 
zelotarum.  On 12 March 1651, George Thomason obtained a copy of the recently-
published Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society; that is, the 
unauthorized English translation of Hobbes’s De Cive, the Latin statement of his 
political philosophy which had first appeared in print in 1642, followed by a second, 
more widely-available edition in 1647 (on the date and status of the translation, see 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Skinner 1974.  More recently, however, it has been argued that Hobbes is 
‘essentially’ not ‘a defender of de facto power’ (Skinner 1990: 146), and that, apart from the ‘rather 
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Hobbes 1983a:15, and Tuck 1985).  Chapter XVI of De Cive deals with the kingdom 
of God according to the old covenant, and section 15 in particular with the period of 
the Judges, when 
 
 The supreme civill power was therefore Rightly due by Gods own institution 
 to the High-Priest; but actually that power was in the Prophets, to whom 
 (being raysed by God in an extraordinary manner) the Israelites (a people 
 greedy of the Prophets) submitted themselves to be protected, and judged, by 
 reason of the great esteem they had of Prophecies.  The Reason of this thing, 
 was, because that though penalties were set, and Judges appointed in the 
 institution of Gods priestly Kingdome, yet, the right of inflicting punishment, 
 depended wholly on private judgement; and it belonged to a dissolute 
 multitude, and each single Person, to punish or not punish according as their 
 private zeale should stirre them up.  And therefore Moyses by his own 
 command punisht no man with death; but when any man was to be put to 
 death, one or many stirred up the multitude against him or them, by divine 
 authority, and saying, Thus saith the Lord.2 
 
This is a reasonably accurate rendering of the original Latin (virtually identical in the 
two editions), despite the fact that the translator is alleged to have ‘worked in an 
extremely slapdash manner’, resulting in ‘many mistranslations or misunderstandings 
of Hobbes’s text’.3  What it shows is that Hobbes was altogether untroubled by the 
                                                                                                                                            
ephemeral’ Review and Conclusion, ‘Leviathan related only minimally to the ideological context of the 
early 1650s’ (Burgess 1990: 676, 692). 
2 Hobbes 1983b: 211.  For the Latin, see Hobbes 1983a: 245: ‘Facto autem potestas illa in Prophetis 
erat, quibus (à Deo extraordinarie suscitas) Israelitiæ (gens Prophetarum auida) propter existimationem 
Prophetiæ protegendos se, & iudicandos subiecerunt.  Ratio cuius rei erat, quod institutione Regni Dei 
Sacerdotalis, etsi pœnæ statutæ fuerint & Magistratus qui iudicarent; ius tamen pœnas sumendi 
dependebat ab arbitrio priuato.  Et penes dissolutam multitudinem & singulos erat, punire vel non 
punire prout à priuato zelo excitarentur.  Ideoque Moses, imperio proprio morte multauit neminem; sed 
quando interficiendus aliquis esset, vnus vel plures, in eum vel eos, (authoritate diuina, dicendoque, 
Hoc dicit Dominus) multitudinem concitauit.’ 
3 Hobbes 1998: xxxvi.  The new translation is as follows (198): ‘In fact that power was in the hands of 
the Prophets (who were raised up by God outside the ordinary course of things); and the Israelites (a 
people avid of Prophets) submitted to them for protection and arbitration, because they had a high 
regard for Prophecy.  And the reason for this was that by the institution of the Priestly Kingdom of 
God, although there were penalties laid down and Magistrates to give judgment, still the right to inflict 
punishment depended on private initiative.  And it was up to the disunited multitude of the people and 
to individuals either to punish or not as they were prompted by private inclination.  This was why 
Moses did not condemn anyone to death on his own authority; but when anyone was to be put to death 
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notion of ‘private zeale’ in November 1641, when the manuscript of De Cive was 
completed (see Hobbes 1983a: 76), and remained so until at least January 1647, when 
the second edition was published.4  Or, to put it another way, throughout this period 
Hobbes remained fundamentally in agreement with the account of the ius zelotarum 
offered by Hugo Grotius in his De Iure belli ac pacis (1625).  According to Grotius, it 
was a peculiarly Jewish relic of a right to punish that had originally belonged to each 
and every individual in the state of nature:   
 
 There remain some Footsteps of the antient Right in those Places, and amongst 
 those Persons, who are not subject to any established Courts of Judicature; and 
 even among those who are so subject, in some particular Cases.  Thus by the 
 Law of Moses, any private Man might upon the Spot, and with his own Hands, 
 kill a Jew who had forsaken GOD and his Law, or who attempted to seduce 
 his Brother to Idolatry.  The Hebrews call this the Judgment of Zeal, which 
 was first put in Execution by Phineas, and afterwards passed into a Custom.5 
 
By the spring of 1651, however, this had become a ‘dangerous opinion’ which 
Hobbes was anxious to refute - all the more so because the Philosophicall Rudiments 
made it known to an English readership that it was an opinion he himself had once 
held, and, to all appearances, still did.6 
                                                                                                                                            
(whether it was one man or several men), he relied upon divine authority to rouse the crowd against 
him or them, saying, Thus saith the Lord.’ 
4 It should be noted, however, that Hobbes allowed the passage to stand unchanged when De Cive was 
later published as part of his Opera philosophica (see Hobbes 1668: sigs. TTT2v-3r/132-3 (third 
pagination)), while he deleted the Review and Conclusion from the accompanying Latin translation of 
Leviathan.  Perhaps the conclusion to be drawn is that Hobbes was au fond a confirmed Grotian on the 
ius zelotarum, but wavered between 1649 and 1651. 
5 Grotius 1738: 414.  For the original Latin, see Grotius 1625: 409: ‘manent vestigia ac reliquiæ prisci 
iuris in iis locis atque inter eas personas quæ certis iudiciis non subsunt: ac præterea in quibusdam 
casibus exceptis.  Sic Hebræorum moribus Hebræus à Deo & Dei lege deficiens aut ducem se ad falsos 
cultus præbens illico à quouis homine poterat interfici.  Iudicium Zeli id vocant Hebræi quod à Phinea 
primo exercitum aiunt, & inde abiisse in morem.’  
6 The fact that Hobbes placed himself in the Grotian camp on this issue makes Anthony Ascham’s 
attack on him in Of the Confusions and Revolutions of Goverments (November 1649) all the more 
puzzling.  Arguing that ‘such a totall resignation of all right and reason, as Mr. Hobbes supposes, is one 
of our morall impossibilities’, Ascham points out that it is ‘directly opposite to that antient Ius 
zelotarum among the Jewes’, and goes on to cite Grotius against Hobbes (Ascham 1649: 121).  Skinner 
suggests that by this time Ascham had read De Cive (see Skinner 1974: 94), which, in theory, was 
available to him in the Latin editions of 1642 and 1647, and in the French translation which Sorbière 
had completed by July 1649 (see Hobbes 1649: sig. **1v).  If so, then Ascham overlooked the 
significance of XVI.15.  The alternative is that Ascham had access to a manuscript of Hobbes’s 
Elements of Law, Natural and Politic (see Tuck 1979: 123), which does not discuss the ius zelotarum.  
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 We should note, however, that there is evidence of mounting concern on 
Hobbes’s part even before the unexpected appearance of Philosophicall Rudiments.  
In particular, the version of the passage in Elemens philosophiqves du citoyen (1649), 
the authoritative French translation of De Cive by his friend, Samuel Sorbière, 
deliberately obfuscates matters at the crucial point (Hobbes 1649: 339-40; my 
emphasis):   
 
 La raison de celle estoit, que par l’establissement du regne Sacerdotal de Dieu, 
 bien que des peines fussent ordonnées, & qu’il y eust des Magistrats establis 
 pour rendre iustice; toutesfois le droit de punir dependoit de la volonté des 
 particuliers; Et il estoit en la puissance d’une multitude déjoincte de faire, ou 
 de ne pas faire supplice, suivant que les personnes privées se trouvoient 
 poussées de zele, ou animées de quelque passion. C’est pourquoy nous ne 
 voyons point que Moyse ait iamais fait mourir personne de sa propre authorité: 
 mais quand il y en avoir quelques-uns dont il se vouloit defaire, il excitoit 
 contr’eux la multitude, employant l’authorité divine, & disant que Dieu le 
 commandoit ainsi. 
 
Sorbière literally dismantles the concept of zelus privatus; first, by transferring the 
epithet ‘private’ from ‘zeal’ to ‘persons’ (now ‘private persons’, in conventional 
apposition to ‘magistrates’); and then by adding the italicized phrase, ‘or animated by 
some passion’, which implies that zeal is just one of several possible impulses to 
action.  Hobbes’s own silence on the ius zelotarum in the body of Leviathan is no less 
eloquent. Not only does he not discuss it in Chapter 35, but he also fails to do so in 
Chapter 40 - the one that actually corresponds to Chapter XVI of De Cive.  But the 
strategy of obfuscation and omission came unstuck once Philosophicall Rudiments 
was in the public domain; for what this made necessary was an open and unequivocal 
repudiation of the Grotian doctrine.7  
 However much Hobbes may have wished to bury the topic in silence, 
therefore, he was finally unable to do so.  The improvisations forced upon Hobbes – 
usually the most systematic of thinkers - are nevertheless deeply instructive.  For what 
                                                 
7 The additional comments on Chapters 35 (private zeal) and 36 (the word of God) in the Review and 
Conclusion (Hobbes 1996: 487-9) appear to be a last-minute insertion: without them, the text reads 
continuously. 
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these manoeuvrings testify to is the crucial role of the notion of private zeal in the 
anti-monarchism of these years.  As we shall see, much of the debate over the 
regicide, both at the time and subsequently, was conducted in terms of what the ius 
zelotarum did or did not entail.  Even years later, when reviewing the events of the 
Civil War and Interregnum in Behemoth, Hobbes was still convinced that ‘the 
interpretation of a verse in the Hebrew, Greek, or Latin Bible, is oftentimes the cause 
of civil war and the deposing and assassinating of God’s anointed’ (Hobbes 1990: 
144).  Furthermore, if this account of how the controversy surrounding the regicide 
thrust its way into the Review and Conclusion is correct, then it would also help to 
explain why Hobbes is so insistent upon the complexity of the ideological landscape 
which he has to traverse.  Thus he fears for the reception of Leviathan at a time when 
‘much of that Doctrine, which serveth to the establishing of a new Government, must 
needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old’.  And in the 
concluding paragraph of the work he again laments the inauspicious moment of 
Leviathan’s publication in April 1651.  Ironically invoking a superstition of exactly 
the kind which the work was meant to dispel, he remarks that ‘there can be no very 
good Constellation for Truths of this nature to be born under, (as having an angry 
aspect from the dissolvers of an old Government, and seeing but the backs of them 
that erect a new;)’ (Hobbes 1996: 489, 491).8  Hobbes’s astrological metaphor, 
implying that Leviathan came into the world under the sign of Gemini (which is 
literally true), applies also to the infancy of the English republic.  This was a period 
when, so Hobbes thinks, politics faced two ways simultaneously. 
 But if Hobbes was the first to conceive of regicide and republicanism as 
twinned but opposite phenomena, he was certainly not the last since his metaphor 
continues to exercise a powerful influence on modern historiography.  For many 
historians it is still the case that to see the ‘angry aspect’ of the regicides means only 
being able to see the back of the republicans, while to inspect the republicans’ gaze is 
necessarily to occlude their view of the regicides.  Furthermore, many accounts of the 
transition from monarchy to Commonwealth depend heavily on Hobbesian antitheses 
between reason and passion and between religious zeal and scepticism.  John 
Morrill’s recent summary is typical: ‘the English revolution saw a violent act carried 
out by a fairly isolated band of well-placed soldiers and civilians, mainly driven by 
                                                 
8 For Hobbes’s familiarity with, but disparagement of, astrology, see Hobbes 1976: 295, 435-42. 
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religious fanaticism (the regicides) which gave rise to a political programme 
supported by a wider and more pragmatic group (the republicans)’ (Morrill 1993: 23).  
There is of course a deeply conservative message embedded in this and similar 
accounts: how reassuring to find that this violent project was after all exclusively the 
work of religious fanatics; how fortunate that normal political life resumed so swiftly 
once more sober counsels gained the upper hand; what relief, in short, to be able to 
draw a veil over this embarrassing moment in English history when a sudden upsurge 
of religious mania (thankfully confined to an isolated and unrepresentative band of 
fanatics) resulted in the violent termination of the monarchy.  But however comforting 
this version of events may be, it appears to dismiss too readily the possibility that the 
actions of the regicides could be – and actually were- defended on rational grounds.  
There is scope, therefore, it seems to me, to re-examine the supposedly ill-fated 
conjunction between religion, regicide and republicanism. 
 It is true nevertheless that those who espouse Morrill’s view of the regicide are 
able to marshal an imposing array of evidence.  They can point first of all to the 
prevalence of the associated concepts of blood-guilt and retribution.  The idea that the 
shedding of blood was a moral offence which someone had a duty to punish was 
underpinned by a series of scriptural texts such as Numbers 35:33: ‘for blood it 
defileth the land: and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but 
by the blood of him that shed it’.  Secondly, they can show that from the mid-1640s 
onwards Charles I was increasingly spoken of in these terms, and that the effect of 
this discussion (‘operating’, as Patricia Crawford puts it, ‘on another level from 
rational argument’) was to desacralize his person (Crawford 1977: 42).  The fatal step 
in the process by which Charles finally ‘delegitimized himself and his office’ was his 
decision to go to war a second time (Morrill 1993: 21).  In late April 1648, as the 
military situation in Scotland and Wales worsened, the leaders of the New Model 
Army held a three-day prayer meeting at Windsor Castle, the outcome of which was a 
resolve ‘to call Charles Stuart, that man of blood, to an account for the blood that he 
had shed, and the mischief he had done … against the Lord’s cause and people in 
these poor nations’ (Gentles 1992: 246).  For several historians, the road leads straight 
from the ‘scripture-laden hysteria’ of the Windsor meeting to the scaffold outside the 
Banqueting House at Whitehall.  According to David Underdown, the ‘Army was 
now out of hand; Cromwell and Ireton could no longer control it even if they wished’ 
(Underdown 1971: 96).  For Ian Gentles, the meeting represents an ‘emotional 
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catharsis’ which issued in ‘consensus’.  Now ‘propelled’ by the conviction that 
Charles was a man of blood, the Army simply ‘rode roughshod over the will of the 
people, to bring the King to his public trial and execution’ (Gentles 1991: 90, 99).  
And David Smith agrees that nothing ‘could cut through’ ingrained mental habits of 
obedience and deference but ‘another, deeper, religious imperative – the need to 
expiate the king’s “blood-guilt”’.  When the Army adopted this doctrine, he adds, they 
‘unleashed savage, elemental forces’ (Smith 1991: 44). 
 To talk of ‘hysteria’ and ‘catharsis’, or of the Army’s getting ‘out of hand’, or 
being ‘propelled’ by ‘imperatives’, is to suggest an outbreak of collective psychosis.  
But there are also examples of individual agents – either actors in or apologists for the 
regicide – apparently in the grip of similar irrational forces. 
 It was only in the Remonstrance, drafted by Henry Ireton before being 
approved by the General Council on 16 November 1648 and presented to the 
Commons four days later, that the call for ‘Capital punishment upon the principall 
Author … of our late warres, and thereby the blood thereof expiated’ officially 
became part of the Army’s demands ([Ireton] 1648: 64; see Underdown 1971: 116-
26). The Remonstrance itself was a lengthy, austere document and an abridged 
version, possibly the work of the Army chaplain Hugh Peter, was issued late in 
December.9  Peter’s other contribution was to equip the text with appropriate 
‘Marginall Attestations ... for the better understanding, remembrance, and judgment of 
the people’.  Accordingly, when Peter comes to the demand for ‘publike justice’ and 
for blood to be ‘avenged’, he cites Numbers 35, Deuteronomy 19 and 2 Samuel 21 in 
the margin.  And he illustrates his dissent from the claim that the king is ‘not 
accountable to or punishable [by] any power on earth’ by depicting Joshua, Gideon, 
Ehud, Jehoiada and Jehu as ‘Gods Instruments’ executing ‘solemne punishment on 
wicked kings’ ([Peter] 1648: 3, 6-7, 8/sig. B1v). 
 John Milton had a longstanding interest in material of this kind.  In the late 
1630s or early 1640s, he drew up a series of outlines for biblical tragedies.  These 
included a ‘Moabitides or Phineas’ in which, he thought, ‘it may be argud about 
reformation & punishment illegal & as it were by tumult[;] after all arguments drivn 
home then the word of the lord may be brought acquitting & approving phineas’ 
(Milton 1982: 560) .  In The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (February 1649), he 
                                                 
9 I am grateful to Austin Woolrych for the suggestion that Peter was responsible for the Abridgment. 
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discusses Ehud and Jehu (though not Phineas).  And while Milton does not cite any of 
the standard scriptural texts on the punishment of murder, he clearly has them in 
mind.  He cannot see why the king 
 
 should think to scape unquestionable, as a thing divine, in respect of whom so 
 many thousand Christians destroy’d should lie unaccounted for, polluting with 
 their slaughterd carcasses all the Land over, and crying for vengeance against 
 the living that should have righted them. (Milton 1991: 18)   
 
 John Price in Clerico-Classicum, Or, The Clergi-allarum to a third war (also 
February 1649), invokes the whole panoply of scriptural proofs.  He is adamant that 
 
 These impulses of spirit, and impression upon the hearts of the Army, to put 
 the Parliament into a condition and capacity of executing judgement and 
 justice upon that great Delinquent of the Land, and which did inspire the 
 highest Court of Justice with courage and faithfulness therein, was the same 
 spirit whose finger hath written that morall precept in the hearts of men, and 
 that sacred rule of Gods written word Numb 35. 16 [the murderer shall surely 
 be put to death]. (Price 1649: 48) 
 
 The Independent divine, John Goodwin, who had read both Milton’s Tenure 
and Price’s Clerico-Classiscum, covers the same ground in hisΥβριστοδικαι The 
Obstructours of Justice (May 1649).  He rehearses the same material from Genesis, 
Deuteronomy and Numbers, and, as we shall see, subjects the case of Phineas to 
exhaustive scrutiny.  Henry Parker, in Scotlands Holy War (January 1651), maintains, 
in the face of Scottish Presbyterian objections, that the ‘change of Government in 
England, which could not be without the execution of the late King’, had been ‘urged 
upon us … by two unanswerable, irresistable arguments’.  The first of these was 
simply ‘that God had commanded us to punish blood with blood in all persons 
whatsoever’ (Parker 1651: 19).  The last word can be left to Oliver Cromwell himself.  
In January 1650, he wrote to Philip Lord Wharton, trying to assuage his doubts about 
the legitimacy of the actions leading to Charles’s execution.  ‘Perhaps’, Cromwell 
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suggests, ‘no other way was left.  What if God accepted the zeal, as He did that of 
Phineas, whose reason might have called for a jury?’ (Abbott 1937-47: II, 189-90). 
 We can perhaps begin to understand Hobbes’s alarm.  Looked at in this light, 
the regicide does appear to be the bloody act of religious fundamentalists.  If this is 
so, then it would tend to support the thesis, proposed by John Morrill in 1984, to the 
effect that the ‘English civil war was not the first European revolution; it was the last 
of the Wars of Religion’.  Morrill has, however, since retreated to a less bold but more 
sustainable position.  He still wishes to assert the ‘centrality of religion in 
destabilizing Britain’ but this is now partly because it helps to explain how 
Parliamentarians overcame their reluctance to invoke resistance theory in the early 
1640s.  In the end, Morrill argues, ‘it was religious arguments which proved to be the 
solvents of resistance to resistance theory’ (Morrill 1993: 43, 68).  It is this modified 
theory which I now wish to challenge, at least in relation to apologists for the regicide, 
and, in particular, to clarify the role of Calvinist resistance theory in the events of 
1649.  My claim is not that these religious arguments are unimportant but that they 
have been misconstrued, and that, construed properly, they actually show just how far 
the supporters of regicide had freed themselves from the sixteenth-century mentality 
to which Morrill would confine them. 
 The first point to be made is that a treatment of these scriptural materials was a 
routine feature of political discourse.  Any early modern discussion of the topic of 
resistance would be expected to examine them at length (George Buchanan’s De Iure 
regni apud Scotos is an exception that proves the rule).  Nor do they function, as it 
were, as some kind of radioactive isotope which can be used to detect malignancy; it 
is simply not the case that the use of certain scriptural examples is a sure sign of a 
more radical, and others of a less radical, orientation.  Rather their precise 
signification is almost invariably dependent upon the larger theory that involves their 
use. 
 This can be illustrated by the differences between two of the leading 
exponents of the Calvinist theory of resistance: Theodore Beza and the author of 
Vindiciae, contra tyrannos.  Both are agreed that resistance to a tyrannical ruler is 
exclusively the province of the inferior magistrate to the exclusion of private persons.  
Both agree moreover that there is one exception to this which arises from the fact that 
it is possible to follow the example of Bartolus of Sassoferrato in distinguishing 
between two types of tyrant; the tyrant by practice and the usurper, or tyrant without 
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title.  The tyrant by practice, who, as Beza puts it, ‘may abuse his position and still 
retain his authority over private subjects’, can be resisted only by the inferior 
magistrate, whereas the tyrant without title can be resisted even by the private citizen 
acting in defence of ‘the legitimate institutions of his country’ (Franklin 1969: 107, 
109). 
 Despite this substantial measure of agreement, however, Beza and the author 
of the Vindiciae still contrive to produce markedly divergent accounts of the violence 
offered to the oppressors of Israel.  When considering ‘the liberations mentioned in 
the Book of Judges’, Beza treats the oppressors as tyrants without title, from which it 
follows that the Israelite judges would have acted lawfully in resisting the ‘tyranny of 
strangers’ irrespective of whether or not they possessed ‘an extraordinary divine 
inspiration for their acts’.  Beza could thus argue that the fact that the judges were 
inspired should not be taken to imply that ‘the magistrates of the Israelites and private 
persons also’ did not have an ‘ordinary’ right to resist tyrants – an argument of 
obvious local relevance in Germany and Switzerland where city states were constantly 
vulnerable to external threats (Franklin 1969: 106).  By contrast, the author of the 
Vindiciae, concerned above all with the internal situation in France, views the 
oppressors of Israel as having originally been tyrants without title who had acquired a 
degree of legitimacy and then, through the abuse of their power, become tyrants by 
practice.  As an example, he offers the case of the Moabite Eglon who, after eighteen 
years’ rule, had established a title by prescription.  But since Eglon had been slain by 
Ehud, it now seemed as if scripture offered a precedent for the individual resistance of 
even tyrants by practice.  In effect, this was to licence assassination, and the author of 
the Vindiciae promptly set about neutralizing the implications of his own argument.  
Considered in themselves, he says, Moses, Ehud and Jehu may appear to be private 
persons.  However, since we know that they received an extraordinary calling from 
God, ‘not only do we not consider them private individuals, but we deem them to be 
more powerful than any ordinary magistrate’.  But this only shifted the problem 
sideways since it was obviously open to individuals to claim that they did have just 
such a calling from God and could therefore follow these scriptural precedents.  This 
forces the author to issue a series of stern warnings.  While it cannot be denied that 
‘the very same God who has visited Pharaohs and Ahabs upon us in this our age, may 
not also raise up a few extraordinary liberators from time to time’, this is a matter 
about which ‘we should be especially sober and circumspect’.  ‘For if anyone lays 
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claim to that authority for himself, as though he were inspired by the divine spirit, he 
should certainly make sure that he is not puffed up with pride, that he is not God to 
himself, that he does not derive that great spirit for himself from within himself’ 
(Garnett 1994: 62-3). 
 This brings us to the situation in the winter of 1648 to 1649, though not quite 
in the manner anticipated by revisionist historians like John Morrill and Conrad 
Russell.  They appear to assume that the opponents of monarchy were initially 
reluctant to adopt the Calvinist theory of resistance, but that once they did so no 
further ideological weapons were required for the purposes of bringing about the 
death of the king.  But this is not the case.  In actual fact, it was the opponents of the 
Army’s purge of Parliament and the trial that followed who had most to gain from the 
Calvinist theory.10  After all, who had a better claim to Calvinist ideology than the 
recently excluded Presbyterians and their supporters?  Conversely, whenever we find 
apologists like Milton, Price and Goodwin citing the classic texts of Calvinism, as 
they repeatedly do, this is largely because they are seeking to embarrass their 
adversaries with their own weapons. 
 In the days before the trial began, the London Presbyterian clergy actively 
sought to halt the proceedings.  Some of them met with the officers at Fairfax’s 
lodgings on 11 January (Fairfax’s wife and mother-in–law were know Presbyterian 
sympathizers and were themselves the target of appeals).  And on 18 January forty-
seven of the Presbyterian ministers issued A Serious and Faithfull Representation of 
the Judgements of Ministers of the Gospell within the Province of London.  The clergy 
reminded the Army leaders that ‘in reference to the Power of Magistracie’ they were 
‘but private persons’.  And they went on to argue that whereas ‘the Lawes of God, 
Nature, and Nations, together with the Dictates of Reason’, had allowed the two 
Houses ‘to take up Armes for their owne Defence’, they did ‘not allow’ the same to ‘a 
multitude of Private Persons’ even though ‘they have strength in their hands to effect 
it’ (Representation 1649: 6).  A number of advantages immediately accrued to the 
ministers from nailing their colours to the Calvinist mast.  The first was that they were 
able to stigmatize the Army as merely a collection of private persons usurping the role 
                                                 
10 Conrad Russell is, like Morrill, exercised by the (alleged) absence of resistance theory in the early 
1640s.  His argument is that if ‘these men were closet resistance theorists, the trial of the King in 1649 
should have given them a belated opportunity to come out’, and the fact that they did not take the 
opportunity retrospectively proves that they cannot have been resistance theorists at the start of the 
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of the inferior magistrates, the point being that prior to the purge, it had clearly been 
the will of the inferior magistrates (that is, of the majority of MPs in the Presbyterian-
dominated House of Commons) to effect a peaceful settlement with the king.  The 
ministers were also exceptionally well placed to counter any attempt to cite those 
scriptures that superficially appeared to sanction political initiatives by private 
individuals.  On the one hand, and attempt to invoke figures such as Ehud or Jehoida 
without specifying that their victims, Eglon and Athalia, were tyrants by practice, 
would automatically fail; for if Eglon and Athalia were merely tyrants without title, 
then their fate could have no bearing on that of Charles, whose title was, for these 
purposes, unquestioned.  On the other hand, any attempt to cite scriptural examples of 
resistance to those specified to be tyrants by practice (thereby establishing their 
relevance since this was a description which arguably did apply to Charles) was to 
open up the topic of divine commands, extraordinary callings and divine vocations.  
In effect, the Army and its supporters would have to identify themselves as 
antinomians and hence become liable to the traditional charges of being puffed up 
with pride, of being gods to themselves and of deriving that spirit for themselves from 
within themselves. 
 Hugh Peter in his Abridgment of the late Remonstrance had already 
anticipated these arguments.  He argued that the fate of Eglon and Athalia was 
relevant however they were classified: 
 
 If it be said that these two last Princes came to the Crown by force & blood, 
 and so were without a title, it may be replyed, that such was the entrance of the 
 first of the English, French, &c. Royall race from whom the present Kings  
 claime; but further, these two had Raigned, and the People been subject to 
 them (which makes the most usuall title,) the one for 18. yeares … the other 
 six yeares. ([Peter] 1648: 8/sig. B1v)  
 
This being the case, Peter simply assumes, though without saying as much, that they 
constitute precedents for private action.  Likewise, according to Milton, the Israelites 
and undoubtedly ‘acknowledge’ Eglon as ‘thir Sovran’ and made themselves ‘his 
proper Subjects’ by taking ‘Oaths of Fealty and Allegeance’.  As we have seen, the 
                                                                                                                                            
decade (Russell 1990: 136).  Quite apart from the dubious logic of this argument, Russell 
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objection to be anticipated at this point was that Ehud must therefore have had ‘a 
speciall warrant’ from God to act as he did in slaying Eglon.  Milton is quite prepared 
to admit that Ehud was ‘a man whom God had raysd to deliver Israel’.  However, it 
was nowhere ‘expressd’ that he had received any positive command from God.  
Rather, Ehud had acted solely on ‘just principles, such as were then and ever held 
allowable’ (Milton 1991: 17-19).  Goodwin simply follows Milton’s account.  First he 
classifies Eglon as a tyrant by practice, ‘unto whom by right of conquest, the 
Israelites had now been in subjection, 18 yeares’ and then flatly denies that ‘the fact 
of Ehud in killing Eglon’ was the ‘off-spring of some super-scripturall converse 
between God, and the spirit of the Actour’ (Goodwin 1649: 45). 
 A similar procedure was followed in treating the case of Phineas.  In An 
Answer to the London Ministers Letter (January 1649), the Baptist minister, Samuel 
Richardson, pointed out that Phineas was ‘no Magistrate’ and was therefore ‘not 
cloathed with any Authority from God or man to do it’, and then denies that Phineas 
had any ‘expresse Command from God’.  Phineas had acted solely out of his zeal for 
the Lord, and Richardson had no doubts that ‘what the Army hath done’ could be 
‘justified upon the same ground’ (Richardson 1649: 2-3).  Goodwin begins by noting 
that Phineas’s action is ‘commonly resolved into an extraordinary instinct, or impulse 
of spirit, from God’, with the implication that ‘without some such warrantie as this it 
had not been justifiable’.  But Phineas had in fact acted solely out of ‘his zeal for 
God’.  However, there could be nothing extraordinary about this since ‘to be zealous 
for God’ is ‘but a regular duty … whereunto we stand all obliged continually’.  His 
act had also been ‘commended and rewarded’ by God ‘as an act of righteousnesse’.  
But it could hardly be said that ‘to act righteously’ required ‘any extraordinary, 
immediate, or forcible incitation from the Spirit of God’; men were ‘bound to 
perform’ such righteous acts merely by the ‘standing and ordinary presence and 
assistance of the spirit’ (Goodwin 1649: 43-4).11 
                                                                                                                                            
misunderstands the ideological situation in 1649.  
11 Here Goodwin was replying to a paper by Henry Hammond, ‘Of the Zelots among the Jewes’, 
appended to the second edition of his Of Resisting the Lawfull Magistrate under colour of Religion, 
where he argues that the ‘Jewish priviledge of Zealots’ must be ‘interdicted’ to Christians since it is 
appropriate only to a theocracy where ‘God immediately presided, and reserved many things to be 
manag’d, & ruled by his peculiar & extraordinary incitation and impulsion’ (Hammond 1644: 55).  
Hammond returned to the issue in To the Right Honourable, the Lord Fairfax, and His Councell of 
Warre: The Humble Addresse of Henry Hammond (January 1649).  
Dzelzainis, ‘Anti-monarchism’ 15
 The arguments advanced by these supporters of the regicide bring into 
question the efforts of those historians who seek to bury the events of 1649 in charges 
of fanaticism and obscurantism.  The paradox that appears to have eluded them is that 
scripture could be cited to secular ends.  Nor have they grasped that a sixteenth-
century ideology designed for waging wars of religion finally proved inadequate for 
the purposes of staging the first European revolution.  For Milton, Goodwin and the 
others simply erased the intricate categories of the Calvinist theory of resistance.  Nor 
was this at all surprising in view of their Arminian tendencies.  As one recent 
commentator puts it, ‘a reaction against Calvinist orthodoxy’ was ‘a unifying 
characteristic of seventeenth-century republicans’ - and nowhere was this more true 
than of the two northern maritime republics; the United Provinces, the home of 
Arminius, and England, the home of his disciples (Worden 1990: 230). 
 Hobbes’s two-pronged attempt to isolate the regicides in the Review and 
Conclusion should be treated with similar scepticism.  In some ways, the energy he 
expends in debunking the concept of private zeal is beside the point, since the 
supporters of regicide are at such pains themselves to avoid any imputation of 
zealotry.  Indeed, in the context of early modern political thought, this is precisely 
what constitutes the revolutionary nature of their claims; that is, that individuals (and 
hence, in this case, the Army) are free to seize the political initiative, and that they are 
free to do so without the sanction of an extraordinary inspiration or divine calling.  All 
that is required of them is to proceed conscientiously and rationally.  As Milton puts it 
with exceptional clarity in The Tenure, in acting against a tyrant ‘no man of cleare 
judgement need goe furder to be guided then by the very principles of nature in him’ 
(Milton 1991: 17). 
 The other tactic Hobbes employs, as pointed out earlier, is to insinuate that 
‘the dissolvers of an old Government’ are facing in a completely different direction 
from those whose business it is to ‘erect a new’.  The implication is that regicides and 
republicans, or (to borrow Pocock’s terminology) saints and citizens, can have little or 
nothing in common ideologically (see Pocock 1975: 361-400).  Once again, however, 
there seems to be no compelling reason to accept this gambit.  This is because by the 
time these apologists for regicide have finished demolishing Calvinist orthodoxy they 
have also, ipso facto, stripped the individual of much of what previously constituted 
him as a private person or subject.  Instead the moral agents they posit in their 
discourses approximate rather more closely to the republican ideal of the citizen.  
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There is no mistaking, for example, the polemical intent with which the author of 
Clerico-Classicum identifies himself on the title page as ‘John Price, Citizen of 
London’.  But, as before, it is Milton who provides the clearest expression of the 
issues at stake.  While much of The Tenure is given over to confronting Calvinists 
with the implications of their Calvinist doctrines (see Dzelzainis 1989), Milton’s own 
premises lie completely outside this frame of reference.  Citing none of the standard 
scriptural texts, he turns instead to the Stoics and, most obviously, to Cicero for an 
alternative account of the right to punish. In De Officiis, Cicero had laid it down that 
‘men are born for the sake of men’, and so form a universal ‘fellowship’ based on ‘the 
exchange of dutiful services’.  Those who do not participate, but instead show 
hostility, in effect exclude themselves from society.  This was most clearly true of the 
tyrant, in whom ‘the wildness and monstrousness of a beast appears in human form’.  
And with the example of Julius Caesar clearly in mind, Cicero unhesitatingly 
concludes that a ‘pestilential’ tyrant, like a wild beast, can be killed by anyone (Cicero 
1991: 10 (1.22), 111 (3.32)).  Milton is content to do little more than reproduce this 
argument in The Tenure.  There is, he says, a ‘mutual bond of amity and brotherhood 
between man and man over all the World’ such that whoever ‘keeps peace with me, 
neer or remote, of whatsoever Nation, is to mee as farr as all civil and human offices 
an Englishman and a neighbour’.  Accordingly, it is not ‘distance of place that makes 
enmitie, but enmity that makes distance’.  The tyrant, by failing to keep peace, 
axiomatically reduces himself to the level of ‘a savage Beast and ‘common pest’ to be 
despatched exactly as Cicero recommended (Milton 1991: 13, 17, 18).  In these pages, 
at least, regicide and republicanism meet face-to-face, and are not, as Hobbes 
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